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HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII
INTRODUCTION

Exit from a business entity can occur in a number of ways.
Exit can occur as a result of individual action. For example, a
shareholder of a corporation can sell her shares in the
corporation. 1 Exit can also occur by collective action. 2 Sticking with
the corporate context, the shareholders of a corporation can vote
to approve a recommendation by the board of directors to dissolve
the corporation. 3 These two examples also demonstrate that the
consequences of exit can be different. In the first example, the
shareholder ends her relationship with the entity, but the entity
continues. 4 In the second example, the collective action leads to the
dissolution of the entity through liquidation. 5 However, the
consequences of the exit are not necessarily tied to the individual
versus collective nature of the action causing the exit. For
example, an individual exit can lead to the dissolution of the
entity. A single partner in a partnership at will can cause the
dissolution of the partnership by merely expressing her will to
cease to be associated with a partnership.6 Conversely, collective
exit does not necessarily lead to the termination of the entity. The
deaths of multiple partners in a partnership at will or a
partnership for a term will cause their interests in the partnership
to cease, but will not necessarily lead to the dissolution of the
partnership. 7 This article explores the intersection of the nature of
the action leading to exit and the consequences of exit. It will argue
that, because of bounded rationality, as individual exit becomes
more difficult, collective exit should become easier. This conclusion
is independent of whether the consequence of individual exit or
collective is the dissolution of the entity.
Individual action leading to an exit from a business entity can
occur in a number of ways and lead to a number of consequences.
As noted above, in some business entities an owner's interest is
freely transferable. For such entities, exit can occur when an
owner sells her interest to someone else. Of course, this depends
1. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.27(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010). No provision in the
MBCA explicitly authorizes the shareholder to transfer shares. However, the absence of
such provision coupled with an express provision governing share transfer restrictions
implies that either the shareholders may freely transfer shares to prevent such transfers
in the absence of transfer restrictions set out in the articles of incorporation, bylaws, an
agreement among shareholders, or an agreement between shareholders and the
corporation.
2.
See id. § 14.02(a).
3.
See id. § 14.02(b)(2).
4.
See id. § 6.27(a).
5.
See id. § 14.03(c).
6. See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 31(1)(b) (1914) (superseded 1992).
7.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 801 (1997) (amended 2013) (death not listed as cause for
dissolution and liquidation).
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on finding a willing buyer. In other entities, an owner can exit by
unilateral action. This could include merely expressing the desire
to leave the entity. Death of the owner can also lead to exit in some
entities. Exit of an individual owner is sometimes caused by the
individual or collective action of others. An owner can sometimes
be expelled by a court order at the behest of another owner or
owners. Exit by court order is not limited to expulsions. Sometimes
an individual owner will petition a court for a dissolution or a
buyout. The consequences of an individual exit can vary. An
individual exit can lead to a dissolution or a buyout.8 The
individual may be liable for damages caused to the entity by the
exit. 9 If a buyout is ordered, the payment may be delayed until a
later date.1 0 In the event of such a delay, the owner is sometimes
compensated by interest and sometimes by the continuing
participation in profits.1 1 Sometimes the exit rights of an owner
will depend on whether another owner has already exited. In
summary, the analysis must focus both on the action causing the
exit and on the consequences of the exit. Both of these vary among
types of entities.
Similarly, collective action can lead to exit from a business
entity with varying consequences. Most of the individual action
described above can take place by multiple actors. Multiple actors
can sell their interests, express their desire to leave, die, or be
expelled. These actions can occur simultaneously or serially. The
consequences of all of the actions can vary. Multiple actors can
petition for a court-ordered dissolution or a buyout. Collective
action can lead to exit in other ways. Mergers can be structured to
cause the exit of some owners. This can occur over the objection of
those owners. Finally, collective action can lead to the voluntary
dissolution of the entity. This can require majority action, super
majority action, or unanimity depending on the type of entity.
All of the default rules governing exit from business entities
involve complex combinations of rights and remedies. 12 Sometimes

8.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1) (1914) (superseded 1992); see also Dreifuerst v.
Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). But cf Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d
890, 894 (Alaska 2004) (explaining dissolution is not always appropriate).
9.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(a)(II) (1914) (superseded 1992).
10.
See id. § 38(2)(b).
11.
See id. § 42.
12.
The rules discussed in this article are primarily default rules. See Robert Gertner
& Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 93-100 (1989) (discussing majoritarian default rules and offering an
analysis of penalty default rules as an alternative). They can be changed by private ordering
among the owners. The form of the private ordering depends on the type of business entity.
In a partnership, the private ordering takes the form of the partnership agreement. In a
corporation, private ordering can occur in the articles of incorporation or the corporation's
bylaws. In a limited liability company, the operating agreement among the owners governs
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rights to exit or prevent the exit of others exist, but are highly
conditional. Sometimes such rights exist, but are enforced by weak
remedies. Sometimes rights to exit depend upon a majority of
owners or the owners of a majority interest desiring an exit.
Because of bounded rationality, at the inception of a business
entity, it is often impossible to predict either which owners will
later desire an exit or which owners will end up in a majority when
a dispute about exit arises.
The next three sections will analyze the individual and
collective actions leading to exit in the three main types of
business entities, partnerships, corporations, and limited liability
companies (LLCs). Section V will analyze the relationship of rights
and remedies. Section VI will analyze the relationship of
individual exit to collective exit. Section VII will analyze the
effects of bounded rationality on the choice of exit norms.
II.

EXIT UNDER PARTNERSHIP LAW

Partnership law has been heavily influenced by two versions
of the Uniform Partnership Act. The 1997 version of the Uniform
Act is in force in some form in most states. 13 However the 1997
version has not been universally accepted. The 1914 version of the
Uniform Act is still in force in a minority of states, including some
commercially important states such as New York. The two
versions of the Uniform Act vary in important ways as applied to
exit. While the law applied to exit from partnerships varies, so do
the facts affecting exit rights. The most important fact affecting
exit rights is whether the partnership is at will or for a term or an
undertaking. As one would expect, exit is substantially easier in a
partnership at will than it is in a partnership for a term or an
undertaking. However, exit from a partnership for a term is easier
than many would expect. The following subsections will explore
these differences.

the relationship among the owners. Default rules are important because they relieve the
owners of the often difficult and costly process of predicting issues that may arise in the
future and tailoring a set of resolutions to those issues. Default rules are often crafted to
yield an outcome that most people would desire if they took the time and trouble to engage
in private ordering. These default rules are referred to as majoritarian default rules.
Default rules are often crafted to yield an outcome that most people would desire if they
took the time and trouble to engage in private ordering.
13.
See UNIF. LAW COMM'N, Legislative Fact Sheet - Partnership Act (1997) (Last
Amended
2013),
http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/LegislativeFactSheet.aspxtitle=Partnership o20
Act%20(1997)%20(Last%2OAmended%202013)
(last visited September 10, 2016)
[http ://perma.cc/7KHU-CNAF].
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A. Exit in Partnershipsat Will
When partners form a partnership, they can expressly or
impliedly agree to remain partners for a specific period of time or
until they accomplish a particular objective. 14 If the partners do
not enter into such an agreement for a term or undertaking, their
partnership is at will. 15 Under the Uniform Partnership Act
(1914), in a partnership at will, a partner can exit the partnership
at any time by expressing the will to withdraw. 16 This exit leads to
the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership, unless the
partners otherwise agree.1 7 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997)
provides for the same result.1 8 Therefore, a partnership at will is
a fragile entity.1 9 Any partner can leave the partnership at any
time, and the default consequence of this exit is the dissolution
and liquidation of the partnership. 20 This fragility can lead to
opportunistic behavior by partners who would benefit from the
dissolution and ensuing liquidation of the partnership. Partners
who can buy its assets at the liquidation sale or who have close
relationships with the firm's customers or suppliers could seek to
capitalize on these strategic advantages by forcing a dissolution
and liquidation.
The Uniform Partnership Act (1914) and the Uniform
Partnership Act (1997) differ in their treatment of exit by death.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), death leads to a
dissolution and liquidation of the partnership as a matter of
default. 2 1 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997), provides that
death leads to an exit from the partnership. 22 However, death is
23
not listed as one of the causes of dissolution and liquidation.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), if an exit occurs but
does not lead to a dissolution and liquidation, a buyout of the
14.
Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 43 (Cal. 1961).
15.
See, e.g., Clark v. Fiedler, 113 P.2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
16.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31(1)(b) (1914) (superseded 1992); Girard Bank v. Haley, 332
A.2d 443, 446 (Pa. 1975).
17.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1) (1914) (superseded 1992); see also Dreifuerst v.
Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). But cf Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d
890, 894 (Alaska 2004) (explaining dissolution is not always appropriate).
18.
UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT §§ 601(1), 801(1) (1997) (amended 2013).
19.
See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners:Cutting the Gordian
Knot With Continuing PartnershipEntities, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS, 7, 10 (1995).
20.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1) (1914) (superseded 1992); see also Dreifuerst v.
Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). But cf Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d
890, 894 (Alaska 2004) (explaining dissolution is not always appropriate).
21.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 31(4), 38(1) (1914) (superseded 1992); see also Girard
Bank, 332 A.2d at 446.
22.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(7)(A) (1997) (amended 2013).
23.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801 (1997) (amended 2013) (death not listed as cause for
dissolution and liquidation).
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partner's interest occurs. 24 Therefore, the Uniform Partnership
Act (1997) provides liquidity for the estate of a deceased partner,
25
however, the estate cannot force a liquidation.
The buyout provided by the Uniform Partnership Act (1997)
raises the thorny issue of valuation. This issue will reoccur
whenever an owner has a buyout right rather than a right to force
a liquidation. 26 Indeed, one of the advantages of a dissolution and
liquidation is that it avoids the issue of valuation. In a liquidation,
the assets of the firm are sold. The proceeds of the sale are first
used to pay the firm's creditors and any money left is divided
among the firm's owners. 27 However, in the context of a buyout, if
the firm and the party entitled to a buyout cannot reach an
agreement about the value of the interest subject to the buyout, a
court will be called upon to determine the buyout price. 28 For small
business entities there are no well-developed, active markets for
the business interest in question. In markets for commodities or
some types of real property there are frequent sales of similar
products. Similarly, in markets for shares of large publicly traded
companies, purchases and sales occur many times a day. However,
small businesses are infinitely variable, as are the interests of
individual co-owners of various businesses. Therefore, courts have
no easily available information about recent sales of similar
business interests. This creates great uncertainty about what
price the court will impose on the parties of the buyout. This
uncertainty is a disadvantage for the buyer and the seller.
Expressions of the desire to leave a business entity and death
are not the only events that can lead to exit from a business
entity. 29 When owners become unhappy with each other, they may
seek to expel another owner from the entity while continuing to
operate the entity themselves. 30 Alternatively, owners may
24.
See id. § 701(a).
25.
The relationship between exits that cause a dissolution and those that do not will
be discussed in detail in connection with exits from partnerships for a term in the next subsection. See infra text accompanying notes 48-53.
26.
Buyouts occur under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) when a partner dies,
when a partner wrongfully expresses the will to leave a partnership for a term, and when
a partner is expelled by a court order. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601 (amended 2013). In the
corporate context, a buyout will sometimes occur when a shareholder has petitioned for a
court-ordered dissolution, but the court orders a buyout instead. See In re Dissolution of
Clever Innovations, Inc., 941 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-780 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
27.
The division of assets among the firm's owners will vary depending on the original
contributions to the entity by the owners and upon whether profits are allocated equally or
proportionately to the contributions of the owners. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 806 (amended
2013). These rules vary among different types of entities.
28.
See Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 894 (Alaska 2004).
29.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1914) (superseded 1992) (listing the different ways a
dissolution may occur).
30.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(5) (1997) (amended 2013).
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collectively cause a dissolution, potentially over the objection of
other owners who would like to keep the entity intact. 31 These
situations have little practical impact in partnerships at will. If
some partners want to expel a fellow owner and continue the
partnership without the expelled partner, the object of the
attempted expulsion can express the will to dissolve and force a
liquidation. Similarly, a partnership vote to cause a dissolution
over the objection of partners who would like to keep the
partnership intact does not arise in a partnership at will. In a
partnership at will, even a single partner can cause a dissolution
32
and liquidation over the objection of all of the other partners.
These scenarios raise important and complex issues in other
business entities, including partnerships for a term or
undertaking.
B. Exit in Partnershipsfor a Term or Undertaking
Rather than entering into an at will relationship, partners
can agree to continue their relationship until the expiration of a
term or until they accomplish a particular undertaking. Such
33
agreements can be implied by the conduct of the partners.
However, just because partners agree to a term or an undertaking
does not mean that they must remain partners until the expiration
of the term or the accomplishment of the undertaking. Instead,
partners are allowed to exit prematurely and face potentially
unpleasant remedies. Further, a premature exit will affect the
rights of the remaining partners. The Uniform Partnership Act
(1914) and the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) treat exit from
partnerships for a term differently.
The Uniform Partnership Act (1914) allows a partner in a
partnership for a term to exit the partnership by expressing the
34
will to cease to be associated with the carrying on of the business.
However, the exiting partner is liable for any damages caused to
the partnership. 35 The remaining partners have the right to
continue the partnership business for the remainder of the term,
possess its property, and use the name, so long as all the
remaining partners consent. 36 The continuing partners are
required to pay to the exiting partner the value of her interest, less

31.
See id. § 32 (showing that a court shall decree a dissolution over objection of other
owners if it has satisfied Section 32).
32.
See, e.g., Hillman, supranote 19.
33.
See Zeibak v. Nasser, 82 P.2d 375, 381 (Cal. 1938).
34.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 31(2) (1914) (superseded 1992).
35.
See id. § 38(2)(a)(ii).
36.
See id. § 38 (2)(b).
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damages, not counting goodwill. 37 The continuing partners may
defer paying this amount until the end of the term38 if they post a
court approved bond to secure the payment. 39 The exiting partner
is entitled to indemnity against creditors 40 and at her election can
receive an interest or a share of profits to compensate her for the
41
delay in payment.
Thus, a partner in a partnership for a term or undertaking is
not required to remain a partner. She may express the will to leave
the partnership and cease being a partner. In some situations her
exit may not subject her to many adverse consequences. Her exit
may not cause much damage to the partnership. Further, all of the
remaining partners may not wish to continue the business and the
partnership will then dissolve. Even if all of the remaining
partners do desire to continue the business, they may decide to pay
the exiting partner immediately. Even if they do not, the exiting
partner has her interest secured by a court-approved bond and will
receive, at her election, an interest or a share in the profits of the
continuing business. At the most basic level, even if a partner has
contracted to remain a partner for a specified time, she may still
exit the partnership at her election. Her promise to remain in the
partnership is not specifically enforceable.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), a partner in a
partnership for a term or undertaking may also exit the
partnership by expressing the will to leave. 42 However, the
consequences of that exit are different, both for the exiting partner
and the other partners. 43 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997)
introduced an additional concept addressing exit in addition to
dissolution. A partner's exit from a partnership is called a
45
dissociation. 44 The exit will sometimes cause a dissolution.
46
However, a dissociation may occur without causing a dissolution.
Therefore, the list of events causing a dissociation is longer than

37.
See id. § 38 (2)(c)(ii).
38.
Although section 38 does not expressly specify the time of payment, it does
provide that the continuation right is for the remainder of the specified term. See id. § 38
(2)(b).
39.
See id.
40.
See id. § 38(2)(b) (1914) (superseded 1992).
41.
See id. § 42; see also Matteson v. Matteson, 2008 WI App 71, 25, 309 Wis. 2d
311, 331, 749 N.W.2d 557, 567-68 (explaining that an exiting partner has two primary
options upon a partnership dissolution when payment is delayed: interest or profits).
42.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(1) (1997) (amended 2013).
43.
See Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 745 N.W.2d 299, 310 (Neb. 2008).
44.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601 (1997) (amended 2013); McCormick v. Brevig, 2004
MT 248, 34, 322 Mont. 112, 121, 96 P.3d 697, 703.
45.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 801 (1997) (amended 2013).
46.
See id. § 701(a).

2016]

ENTITY EXIT

the list causing dissolution. 47 If a partner in a partnership for a
term expresses the will to withdraw from the partnership, that
expression constitutes a dissociation 48 but does not cause a
dissolution. 49 The dissociating partner owes the partnership
damages caused by the early exit. 50 The dissociating partner is
entitled to a buyout at the greater of liquidation or going concern
value. 51 Unlike the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), there is no
exclusion of the value of goodwill. 52 The dissociating partner must
be indemnified against partnership creditors 53 and receives
interest until her buyout is paid. 54 Unlike the Uniform
Partnership Act (1914), the exiting partner does not have the
option of receiving a share of the profits instead of interest. 55 The
buyout price is due at the end of the term, unless the dissociating
partner can show that the partnership would suffer no undue
hardship if it is required to pay earlier. 56 The delayed payment
must be adequately secured. 57 Unlike the Uniform Partnership
Act (1914), there is no requirement that the security take the form
of a court approved bond.
One of the most significant differences in the treatment of exit
by expression under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) and the
Uniform Partnership Act (1997) relates to the rights of partners
who do not want to continue with the partnership following
someone else's exit. Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914),
the continuation of the partnership business without liquidation
requires the consent of all of the remaining partners. 58 Therefore,
if one of the remaining partners wants to force a liquidation
following the exit of a wrongful partner, she may do so by
withholding her consent to the continuation. However, under the
Uniform Partnership Act (1997) following a wrongful exit by
expression the partnership continues unless half of the remaining
partners state their desire to leave the partnership within ninety
days of the original wrongful exit. 59 If fewer than half of the
47.
Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601 (1997) (amended 2013), with § 801.
48.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601(1) (1997) (amended 2013).
49.
See id. § 801(1).
50.
See id. § 602(c).
51.
See id. § 702(b); McCormick, 96 P.3d at 703.
52.
Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(II) (1914) (superseded 1992), with UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 702(b) (1997) (amended 2013).
53.
UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 701(d) (1997) (amended 2013).
54.
See id. § 701(b).
55.
Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 42 (1914) (superseded 1992), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 701(b) (1997) (amended 2013).
56.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701(h) (1997) (amended 2013).
57.
Id.
58.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b) (1914) (superseded 1992).
59.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(2)(A) (1997) (amended 2013).
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remaining partners desire to leave, they may rightfully dissociate
so long as they do it within the same ninety day period.60 As
rightfully dissociating partners they do not owe damages 1 or face
a delay in payment.6 2 However, they cannot force a liquidation.
Therefore, a partnership for a term formed under the Uniform
Partnership Act (1997) is less fragile than a partnership for a term
formed under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) following a
wrongful exit by expression. This is because it takes half of the
remaining partners to force a liquidation rather than just one.
The treatment of death as an exit event in partnerships for a
term under both partnership statutes parallels its treatment in
partnerships at will. Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914),
death leads to a dissolution,6 3 while under the Uniform
Partnership Act (1997) death leads to a dissociation but not a
dissolution.6 4 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) treats the
rights of the surviving partners following a dissociation by death
in the same way it does those rights following a wrongful
dissociation by expression.6 5 If within ninety days of the death at
least half of the remaining partners opt to leave the partnership,
it is dissolved.6 6 If fewer than half of the remaining partners opt to
leave they may rightfully dissociate within ninety days6 7 without
facing a delay in payment6 8 or liability for damages.6 9 Therefore, a
partnership formed under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) is
less fragile than one formed under the Uniform Partnership Act
(1914) in the event of the death of a partner in a partnership for a
term.
Discord among partners is a more serious matter in a
partnership for a term than in a partnership at will. In a
partnership at will, if discord develops among partners, anyone
may express the will to exit and force a dissolution.7 0 However, in
a partnership for a term, anyone who responds to discord by
expressing the will to leave will be a wrongfully withdrawing
partner.7 1 Such an exiting partner would face the damages
60.
See id. § 602(b)(2)(A) (1997) (amended 2013).
61.
See id. § 602(c).
62.
See id. § 701(h).
63.
UNIF. PSHIP ACT §§ 31(4), 38(1) (1914) (superseded 1992).
64.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 601(7)(A) (1997) (amended 2013).
65.
See id. §§ 602, 701, 801.
66.
See id. § 801(2)(A).
67.
See id. § 602(b)(2)(A).
68.
But ef id. § 701(h) (suggesting that only partners who wrongfully dissociate a
partnership face a delay in payment).
69.
But ef id. § 602(c) (suggesting that only partners who wrongfully dissociate as a
partner are liable to the partnership for damages caused by the dissociation).
70.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
71.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 602(b)(2)(A) (1997) (amended 2013).
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available under both partnership statutes. 72 Partners unhappy
with the conduct of other members of the partnership have options
other than expressing under both partnership statutes.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), partners may be
able to get a court-ordered dissolution and continue the
73
partnership business without the partner who is behaving badly.
74
Events causing a dissolution include a decree of court. Grounds
for a court-ordered dissolution include conduct that is prejudicial
to the carrying on of the business, 75 willful or persistent breaches
of the partnership agreement, 76 and circumstances that make
dissolution equitable. 77 If the complaining partners can establish
such grounds the court shall decree a dissolution. The question
then is whether the dissolution leads to a liquidation or whether
the other partners can continue without the badly behaving
partner.
The Uniform Partnership Act (1914) allows the remaining
partners to continue the business if the dissolution is caused in
contravention of the agreement and all of the remaining partners
choose to continue. 78 As discussed above, in a partnership for a
term, if a partner causes a dissolution of a partnership for a term
by expressing the will to leave the partnership, the remaining
partners have the right to continue. 79 If a partnership for a term
is dissolved by court-order because a partner has willfully
breached the partnership agreement, it can be argued that the
dissolution was "caused in contravention of the partnership
agreement." 80 The breaching partner would then be the one who
"caused the dissolution wrongfully." 8 1 In effect, the petitioning
partners would have expelled the breaching partner with the help
of the court. One textual problem with this argument is that of the
six causes of dissolution listed in section 31 of the Uniform
Partnership Act (1914), only one is labeled as being in
contravention of the agreement. That cause of dissolution is the
82
expressed will of a partner in a partnership for a term.

72.
See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(a)(II) (1914) (superseded 1992); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
602(c) (1997) (amended 2013).
73.
See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b) (1914) (superseded 1992).
74.
Id. § 3 1(6).
75.
Id. § 32(1)(c).
76.
Id. § 32(1)(d).
77.
Id. § 32(1)(f).
78.
See id. § 38(2)(b).
79.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
80.

See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 38(2) (1914) (superseded 1992).

81.
82.

Id. § 38(2)(c).
See id. § 31(2).

12

HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII

Dissolution by decree of the court is not so labeled. 83 If the statute
is read as limiting dissolutions in contravention of the agreement
to those caused by expression, partners who are the victims of
egregiously bad conduct by another partner would be forced to
either put up with the conduct or face a liquidation of the
partnership. The breaching partner could, of course, buy the assets
of the partnership in the liquidation sale. A better interpretation
of the statute would conclude that the breaching partner has
caused the dissolution wrongfully and allow the rightful partners
to continue with the partnership business for the agreed upon
term.
The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) allows the rightful
partners to force the wrongful partner out and continue the
partnership business as of right. Among the events of dissociation
listed in section 601 is "the partner's expulsion by judicial
84
determination" on application of the partnership or a partner.
Grounds for such a judicial expulsion include wrongful conduct
harming the partnership, breach of the partnership agreement,
and conduct that makes it impractical to continue in business with
the expelled partner. 85 If the partnership is for a term, such an
expulsion is wrongful. 86 Therefore, the rightful partners would
have the same rights to continue, dissociate, or dissolve that they
would have if the wrongful partner had expressed the desire to
leave in contravention of the term. 87 Rather than seeking to expel
a partner who has behaved badly, an aggrieved partner can seek
a court-ordered dissolution and liquidation of the partnership if a
partner has behaved in a way that it is not practical to continue in
88
business with that partner.
One last form of dissolution of a partnership for a term is also
important. Under both partnership statutes, a partnership for a
term will dissolve if all of the partners want it to. 89 This is, of
course, the case in any contractual commitment. If all of the
parties to a contractual relationship want to end the relationship,
they may. If partners agree to be in the buggy whip business for
the next twenty years, they can unanimously agree to end their
buggy whip partnership early if the buggy whip business becomes
unprofitable, or for any other reason. Similarly, if the friendly
83.
See id. § 31(6).
84.
UNIF. PsHIP ACT § 60 1(5) (1997) (amended 2013); Robertson v. Jacobs Cattle Co.,
830 N.W.2d 191, 201 (2013).
85.
See Robertson, 830 N.W.2d at 201.
86.
UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 602(b)(2)(ii) (1997) (amended 2013).
87.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
88.
UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 801(5)(ii) (1997) (amended 2013).
89.

See UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 31(1)(c) (1914) (superseded 1992); UNIF. PSHIP ACT §

801(2)(ii) (1997) (amended 2013).
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relationships in a partnership for a term become acrimonious, the
partners are not legally required to continue their relationship
until the end of the term. They may unanimously agree to end
their partnership.
In summary, the distinction between partnerships at will and
partnerships for a term is somewhat misleading. If the label
"partnership for a term" was taken literally, such a partnership
would last until the end of the term. Partners would not be allowed
to leave. However, even in partnerships for a term, partners can
leave. They can die, express to leave, or be expelled. In these
events sometimes the partnership continues without them and
sometimes it is liquidated. However, in any event, the partner who
has promised to stay in the partnership until the end of the term
is allowed to leave. The promise to remain in the partnership is
not specifically enforceable. The remedies enforcing the promise
are conditional and weak. Therefore, even partnerships for a term
are fragile entities because a partner who changes her mind will
be allowed to leave.
III. EXIT UNDER CORPORATE LAW
Exit from a corporation is easy if a shareholder can find
someone willing to buy her shares. Shares in a corporation are
property and freely transferable under default corporate rules. 90
However, what happens if a shareholder wants to leave, but
cannot find anyone who wants to purchase the shares?
Alternatively, what happens if a shareholder wants to continue to
own the shares, but the other shareholders want to force her to sell
her shares?
Compared to partnerships, corporations are more stable. If a
shareholder expresses the will to leave the corporation, that
expression has no effect. If a shareholder dies, her shares pass to
her heirs. 91 Management of corporations is more centralized than
partnerships. Shareholders elect directors who oversee the
management of the corporation. 92 A majority of the directors have
great power over most management issues in a corporation. 93 This
centralization of management makes the relationships among
shareholders less personal than the relationship among partners.
For example, partners are general agents of a partnership and can
90.
See Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).
91.
See generally, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (2013) ("[t]he shares of stock in every
corporation shall be deemed personal property and transferable").
92.
See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.361 (West 2009).
93.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY 129 (Transaction Publishers 2009).
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bind it in contract and tort. Shareholders of a corporation can do
neither of these things. Partners in a general partnership are
personally liable for the debts of the business. Shareholders are
not. Because of the power partners have over the business and
each other, partners need to be very concerned about who they are
partners with. The fragility of partnerships gives partners the
ability to terminate their relationships even in a partnership for a
term. Shareholders in corporations do not have this sort of power
over each other. Therefore, it is not as important for shareholders
to be able to leave a corporation. Shareholders might be stuck with
a losing business, but the extent of their loss is limited to their
initial investment. However, this limited exposure does not mean
that shareholders are stuck with each other with no legal recourse
in the event of discord.
Shareholders can petition a court for a dissolution of the
corporation or a buyout of their interest. 94 Section 14.30 of the
Model Business Corporation Act allows for a judicial dissolution of
a corporation in a number of circumstances. 95 A court may order
such a dissolution in a proceeding by a shareholder if the directors
are acting "in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent."9 6
The most expansive of these terms is "oppressive." Oppressive
conduct is often interpreted as conduct that violates minority
97
shareholders' reasonable expectations.
Defining oppressive conduct as distinct from illegality in the
present context has been considered in other forums. The
question has been resolved by considering oppressive actions
to refer to conduct that substantially defeats the "reasonable
expectations" held by minority shareholders in committing
their capital to the particular enterprise. This concept is
consistent with the apparent purpose underlying the
provision under review. A shareholder who reasonably
expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him
or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in
corporate management, or some other form of security,
would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the
corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there
98
exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.
The reasonable expectations test does not fit well in
situations where the shareholder did not purchase the shares. If
shareholders acquire the shares by gift or bequest, they generally
94.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 14.30(a)(2), 14.34(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).
95.
Id. § 14.30 (2010).
96.
Id. § 14.30 (a)(2)(ii).
97.
12B WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 5820.11 (Sept. 2016).
98.
Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (1984) (citations omitted).
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had no reasonable expectations that motivated their acquisition of
the shares. 99 In such cases courts sometimes ask whether the
conduct of those in charge of the corporation has been burdensome,
harsh, and wrongful. 100 This test inquires into whether those in
charge of the corporation have acted with probity and fairness
toward the minority shareholders.10 1
If a shareholder who has been oppressed files an action for a
court-ordered dissolution, the corporation will not necessarily be
dissolved. Under the Model Act, the corporation or the other
shareholders can respond to the filing of the petition by purchasing
10 2
the shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at fair value.
Thus an action for judicial dissolution may result in a buyout.
In addition to a shareholder forcing a court-ordered
dissolution or buyout, a shareholder may be forced to exit the
corporation over her objection. As discussed above, a partner in a
partnership may sometimes be expelled by a court-order for
various forms of bad behavior. 10 3 In the corporate context, a
shareholder can be forced to give up her shares without any
demonstration of bad behavior and without a court-order.
Understanding how this can happen requires a basic
understanding of merger law. A merger is a statutory device by
which two corporations combine into one. 10 4 In a prototypical
merger two separate businesses combine into one, surviving
corporation. 10 5 The assets of the target corporation become assets
of the surviving corporation and the shareholders of the target
10 6
corporation become shareholders of the surviving corporation.
However, although a merger requires two corporations, it does not
require two actual businesses. Instead, a merger can be created
solely for the purpose of getting rid of some of the shareholders.
Merger law allows some of the shares to be eliminated in
exchange for cash. 1°7 This allows some of the shareholders to lose
their shares in exchange for the right to receive the cash specified

99.
See generally Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
100.
Id. at 1018.
101.
See id. at 1020.
102.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2010).
103.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-88.
104.
Id. §§ 11.01-11.08. A merger is only one means by which a corporation can acquire
the business of another corporation. For example, instead of merging with the target, the
acquiring corporation may acquire the target's shares or purchase its assets.
105.
Id. § 11.02(a).
106.
See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.07 (Am. BAR ASS'N 2010).
107.
See id. § 11.02(c)(3) ("The plan of merger must include ... the manner and basis of
converting the shares of each merging corporation and interests of each merging other
entity into shares or other securities, cash, other property, or any combination of the
foregoing.").

16

HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII

in the merger agreement.10 8 The elimination of these shareholders
can be the motivation for the merger. Indeed, one of the merging
corporations may have been created solely for the purpose of
allowing the merger to take place. An example of this is Coggins
v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.10 9 In that case,
William Sullivan, the controlling shareholder of the corporation
that owned the New England Patriots, caused a new corporation
to be formed.110 The new corporation had the same directors and
officers as the existing corporation. 1 The directors caused both
corporations to enter into a merger agreement that provided that
the shareholders of the existing corporation, other than Mr.
Sullivan, would lose their shares in exchange for the right to
receive $15 per share.1 1 2 Therefore, the corporation that existed
before the merger and the corporation that existed after the
merger were the same, except for the elimination of the minority
shareholders. Mr. Sullivan's motive for causing the two
corporations to merge was that he needed to use the income of the
corporation to pay his own personal debts.1 1 3 This would not have
been possible if the other shareholders were around to object to the
diversion. 11 4 The plaintiff, Mr. Coggins, was a shareholder who
objected to the merger, which was approved by the shareholders
over the dissent of the plaintiff and others. This sort of cash out
merger is an example of how merger law can be used to force a
shareholder to give up their shares in exchange for cash.
A shareholder who dissents from a cash out merger can
sometimes institute an appraisal proceeding to challenge the
amount of the payment.11 5 However, Mr. Coggins did not merely
want to argue about money, he wanted to keep his shares. When
Mr. Sullivan originally caused the corporation to offer shares to
the public he wanted to raise money and encourage fans to bond
with his new team.11 6 Some years later, Mr. Coggins, who was
serving in Vietnam, had his brother purchase the shares on his
behalf and formed the bond that Mr. Sullivan originally wanted to
encourage.1 1 7 To him a transaction that was intended to eliminate
his interest was not merely a matter of money. The court agreed

108.
109.
1986).

See id.
See Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Mass.

110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
See id. at 1115 n.6.
See id. at 1115.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 13.01-13.03 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).
See Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1115 n.8.
See id. at 1115.
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with him. The court held that a transaction that eliminated
shareholders solely to advance the personal interests of the
controlling shareholder was illegal. 118 The court held that at a
minimum a merger must serve some business purpose for the
corporation.1 1 9 This business purpose requirement is not
1 20
universally accepted. Delaware rejects this requirement.
Instead, Delaware imposes a more general fair dealing and fair
1 21
price requirement.
So far this section has discussed three ways a shareholder
may exit a corporation. The most common, least controversial is
that a shareholder may voluntarily sell her shares to a willing
buyer. Second, a shareholder may force a court-ordered dissolution
or buyout. Third, a shareholder may have her shares taken from
her in a cash out merger. In addition to these three ways, a
shareholder may exit a corporation if the corporation is dissolved
pursuant to a vote of the board of directors and the shareholders.
Both the Model Act and the Delaware statute provide for the
dissolution of the corporation on the majority vote of the directors
and the shareholders. 122 These rules are in accord with the general
director centric, majority centric approach of corporate law. Under
these rules, a majority of the directors and shareholders can decide
that the corporation should dissolve. In a dissolution, all of the
shareholders exit, even if some of them would prefer that the
corporation continue and that their interest in it remain intact. On
their face, these rules might seem to mean that corporations are
less stable than partnerships. At least in a partnership for a term,
a voluntary dissolution requires that all partners vote for the
dissolution rather than a mere majority.1 23 However, it is
important to remember that, even in a partnership for a term,
partners have the power to exit wrongfully before the end of the
term.1 24 Further, sometimes these wrongful exits lead to
1 25
dissolutions depending on the actions of the other partners.
Therefore, even in a partnership for a term exit can occur at the
whim of a single partner.
In summary, corporations are relatively stable compared to
partnerships. Although shareholders can voluntarily sell their
shares, this depends on finding a willing buyer. Court-ordered
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 1118-19.
See id. at 1122.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
Id. at 711.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (2013); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 7.25, 8.24, 14.02

(AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).

123.
124.
125.

See supra text accompanying note 89.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-56.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
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dissolutions and buyouts are possible under the Model Act, but
depend on a court finding oppression. Cash out mergers can force
a shareholder to exit, but depend on board and shareholder
approval of the merger, and sometimes the demonstration of a
corporate purpose for the merger. It is always possible that the
corporation may voluntarily dissolve. However, that depends on
majority approval by the board and the shareholders, in accord
with the director centric and majority centric nature of corporate
law.
126
IV. EXIT UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW

Exit from a limited liability company is a hybrid of concepts
of partnership law and corporate law. 127 As to voluntary sales of a
member's interest in an LLC, a member's interest is nominally
assignable. 128 However, such a transfer does not make the buyer a
member of the LLC. 129 Instead, the assignee has the right to
receive any financial distribution that the assignor would have
received. 130 The assignment may or may not cause the assignor to
cease being a member.1 31 All of this is in contrast to the sale of
shares in a corporation which causes the buyer to acquire all of the
rights of the seller.
Expression by a member of an LLC to leave the entity does
not entitle the member to a buyout of her interest under either the
Uniform Act or the Delaware act. The Uniform Act does provide
that a member may dissociate by expression. 132 However, the
member's dissociation does not require the LLC to purchase the
member's interest. 133 Instead, the member's right to participate in
management ends, her fiduciary duty as a member as to
126.
Although the law of limited liability companies is highly variable, this section will
focus on the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) and the Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act.
127.
See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Death of an LLC: What's Trending
in
LLC
Dissolution Law?,
BUS.
L.
TODAY,
January
2016,
at
1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/20 16/0 1/death-llc20160 1.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/FF5R-7KDM]; Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Fundamental Changes in the LLC: A Study in Path-Divergence and Convergence, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 189 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds. 2015).
128.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502(a)(1) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(a)

(2013).
129.

UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502(a)(3)(a) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-

702(b)(1) (2013).
130.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(2) (2013); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502(b)
(2013).
131.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (2013), with UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 502(a)(2) (2013).
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UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 601(a), 602(1) (2013).
133.
See id. § 502(b).
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subsequent actions ends, and she is treated as a transferee of the
financial rights she had as a member.134 So, the expression of the
will to leave causes the member to exit the LLC, but does not get
her anything with respect to her membership unless a distribution
is subsequently made by the company. 135 The Delaware act is
much more straightforward. It provides simply that a member
may not resign from an LLC unless the limited liability company
agreement says she can. 136 If the agreement says a member may
resign, the resigning member is entitled to a payment of the fair
value of her interest. 137
A disgruntled member of an LLC may be able to force a
judicial dissolution of the company and obtain payment for her
interest that way. The Uniform Act allows a court to order a
dissolution of an LLC on the application of a member if "it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the company's activities and
affairs in conformity with the certificate of organization and the
operating agreement." 138 The Uniform Act also allows the court to
order the dissolution if those in control of the company are
behaving in a "manner that is oppressive and ... directly harmful
to the applicant." 139 In the latter situation, the statute allows the
court to "order a remedy other than dissolution." 140 This allows the
court to order a buyout instead of a dissolution. The Delaware act
does not provide for judicial dissolution for oppression but does
provide that a court "may decree dissolution of a limited liability
company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with a limited liability company
14 1
agreement."
A dissolution of an LLC may also occur by the collective action
of its members. The Delaware act provides for the voluntary
dissolution of an LLC on the affirmative vote of members owning
two thirds of the financial interest in the company. 142 The Uniform

134.
Id. § 603; Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 Bus. LAW. 515, 543 (2007).
135.

Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANIES, § 11.2 & n.4 (2016) (explaining that a provision treating a
dissociating member as a mere transferee of their own interest "is sometimes referred to as
a 'Hotel California' provision because the Member may check out at any time but may never
leave").
136.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (2013).
137.
Id. § 18-604.
138.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 701(a)(4)(B) (2013).
139.
Id. § 701(a)(4)(C)(ii).
140.
Id. § 701(b).
141.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2013).
142.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(3) (2013).
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Act provides that an LLC may be dissolved on the unanimous vote
143
of the members.
V.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

The foregoing discussion of the right of an individual owner
or a group of owners to exit a business entity demonstrates the
importance of the relationship of rights to remedies. An owner or
group of owners may not have the right to exit an entity, however
the remedies to enforce the continued relationship of the owners
may be strong or weak. An obligation to continue as owner that is
enforced by a strong remedy keeps the business entity intact. Such
an obligation enforced by a weak remedy makes the entity more
fragile.
An example of an obligation to remain part of an entity
supported by a strong remedy arises in corporate law. When a
shareholder buys stock in a corporation, she is not entitled to exit
the corporation. 144 She can sell her stock to a willing buyer (which
could include the corporation itself). 145 However, if she cannot find
a willing buyer, she cannot exit the entity unless she can meet the
146
stringent standards for a court-ordered dissolution or buyout.
Her continued participation in the entity is self-enforcing.
Substantively, this outcome is not troubling. Her financial
exposure is limited to the amount she paid for the shares. She owes
no duties to the entity or her fellow shareholders, other than to
pay this amount. 147 Her fellow shareholders do not have agency
authority to bind her or the entity. She knew going in that
management would be centralized in the board of directors.
An example of an obligation to remain part of an entity
supported by weak remedies is a partnership for a term or an
undertaking. First, this obligation arises only when the partners
have at least impliedly agreed to accept it.14 8 Without such an
agreement, the partnership is at will and the partners can force a
dissolution and liquidation by merely expressing the will to exit
the partnership. 149 If the partners have agreed to a term, they do
143.
144.
US
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See id. (manuscript at 3-4).
146.
See, e.g., Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898, 898-900 (5th Cir.
1991).
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See David A. Hoffman, The "Duty"to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV.
537,537-38 (2006).
148.
See Tropeano v. Dorman, 441 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2006).
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not have the right to exit the entity. However, this obligation to
remain partners is enforced with weak remedies. This obligation
is not specifically enforceable with injunctive relief. The exiting
partner must pay damages caused by her exit. However, in some
situations these damages would be small or nonexistent. Under
the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), the exiting partner is
required to wait for payment until the end of the term, however
she can elect between interest or profits as compensation for the
delayed payment. 150 Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1997),
the exiting partner receives only interest for the period of the
delayed payment, but can get paid before the end of the term if she
151
can show that the partnership will suffer no undue hardship. If
1 52
the partnership does delay payment, it must provide security.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (1914), that security must
1 53
take the extraordinary form of a court-approved bond.
Therefore, as a practical matter, a partner who has promised to
stay for a term can exit the partnership and in some cases pay
little or no damages. Further, she can sometimes get bought out
before the end of the term.
The obligation of a partner to remain until the end of the term
is further weakened by its conditional nature. If one partner exits
the partnership early, the other partners have the right to exit
without paying damages or facing a delayed payment. Under the
Uniform Partnership Act (1914), a partner who wants to exit
following the exit of another partner can simply withhold consent
to the continuation of the partnership.1 54 This will force the
dissolution of the partnership. Under the Uniform Partnership Act
(1997), such a subsequently exiting partner can express the will to
exit within ninety days of the earlier exit and receive a buyout of
her interest. 155 If half of the remaining partners do so, the
partnership will be dissolved.156 Thus, the commitment of a
partner to remain in the entity until the end of the agreed upon
term can sometimes be of little practical importance because of the
weak remedies supporting it and its significantly conditional
nature.
The obligation to remain in a limited liability company is
more similar to corporate law than to partnership law. First, these
obligations arise as a matter of default and do not require an

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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agreement to remain for a term. Second, these obligations are selfenforcing. In Delaware, an expression of a desire to exit is
ineffective. The member remains in the entity despite the
expression. Under the Uniform Act, an expression of a desire to
exit causes a dissociation of the member from the entity. However,
the former member is then treated as a transferee of her own
interest. She does not have the right to force a buyout of her
interest or the dissolution of the LLC absent a court-order.
Further, unlike a partnership for a term, there is no set date in
the future when a payment would be made to the member. The
member could have her capital stuck in the entity forever.
The varying standards for individual exit from a business
entity make the standards for collective exit crucial.
VI.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF INDIVIDUAL EXIT TO COLLECTIVE EXIT

As discussed in the prior section, the practical effect of an
obligation to remain part of a business entity is a product of right
and remedy. The obligation to remain in a corporation or a limited
liability company is of significant practical effect because this
obligation is supported by a strong, self-enforcing remedy. This
obligation also arises as a matter of default, without an express or
implied agreement of the parties and is not significantly
conditional. In contrast, in a partnership, an obligation to remain
in the entity arises only as the result of an agreement, is
significantly conditional and is supported by weak remedies. 157 In
addition to the relationship of right to remedy, the relationship of
individual exit to collective exit is important.
In a corporation, individual owners have no right to elect to
exit the corporation. 158 However, collectively, a group of owners
can force an exit in the form of a voluntary dissolution of the
corporation. 159 In general, management of a corporation is director
centric and majority centric. It is director centric since most
business decisions are made under the direction of the board of
directors. 16 0 It is majority centric since the majority of the shares
elect the directors. 16 1 The law governing the dissolution of a
corporation is consistent with this approach since a voluntary
dissolution must be recommended by the board of directors and
157.
See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnershipon the Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L.R. 393, 404 (1998).
158.
See Gherghe, Papdima, & Valeanu, supra note 144, at 6.
159.
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Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Inv. Assocs., Inc., 51 A.2d 572, 576 (Del. 1947)
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approved by holders of a majority of the shares. If holders of a
majority of the shares want to dissolve, they can elect a board that
will recommend the dissolution and then the majority shares can
vote to approve this recommendation. 16 2 Minority shareholders
who want the corporation to continue do not have the power to
block this action. Therefore, the default deal among owners of a
corporation is that individual owners have few rights to govern or
to exit. However, owners of a majority of the shares can elect
directors who govern and who, with the owners of a majority of the
shares, can cause a dissolution.
In a partnership, individual owners have greater ability to
exit because an obligation to remain for a term arises only by
agreement, is significantly conditional, and is supported by weak
remedies. However, a majority of owners in a partnership for a
term, cannot force a dissolution unless at least one partner exits
first. Absent such an initial exit, a dissolution would require
unanimous consent of the partners. Therefore, individual exit is
easy, but collective rightful exit is difficult.
In a Delaware LLC individual exit is difficult, but collective
exit is moderately easy. An expression by a member of the will to
withdraw from the entity has no legal effect, unless such exit is
allowed by the operating agreement. 16 3 The expressing member
continues as part of the entity. Collective action seeking the
dissolution of the entity is harder than in a corporation, but easier
than in a partnership for a term. It takes owners of two-thirds of
the financial interest in the LLC to force a dissolution. Thus,
although individual exit is prohibited, members holding a super
majority of the financial interest may force a liquidation of the firm
over the objection of the remaining members.
In an LLC formed under the Uniform Act, both individual exit
and collective exit are difficult. Although the Uniform Act allows
individual members to dissociate by expressing the will to leave,
the dissociated member has no right to force a buyout of her
interest. The dissociated member is treated as a transferee of her
own interest. She will receive any distribution of profits that the
entity chooses to make, but has no management rights or rights to
force a buyout or dissolution. 164 Therefore, although the member
has technically exited the entity, she remains an investor without
the right to participate in management. This status goes on
indefinitely. Collective exit is also difficult. A voluntary dissolution
of an LLC under the Uniform Act requires the unanimous consent
162.
See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).
163.
If the operating agreement allows such exit the entity must repurchase the
members interest for fair value. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604 (2013).
164.

See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 502 (2013).
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of the members. 16 5 Even members owning a super majority of the
financial interest in the LLC may not force a dissolution.
Therefore, both individual exit and collective exit are difficult
since the obligation to remain invested in the entity arises as a
matter of default, is not significantly conditional, is enforced by
strong, self-enforcing remedies and is not subject to override by a
majority of owners short of unanimity.
VII. CHOOSING EXIT NORMS FACED WITH BOUNDED RATIONALITY

Exit from a business entity is one form of mid-term
adaptation to changed circumstances. As the time since the initial
formation of a business entity lengthens, the likelihood that one or
more owners will seek an adaptation increases. At the inception of
a business relationship the parties anticipate various possible
future circumstances. Some of these circumstances are driven by
facts external to the business. These include the demand for the
firm's products and services, the cost of labor and other inputs
consumed by the firm, and the legal environment in which the firm
operates. Other future circumstances are internal to the firm.
These include which of the co-owners will agree with each other
about how the firm should adapt to changed external
circumstances.
Many forms of mid-term adaptation to changed external
circumstances do not involve exit from the firm. The firm can
change how it operates its business. It can change its mix of
products, including leaving the field in which the owners originally
planned on operating and entering completely new fields. Less
dramatically, the firm can change locations, own rather than rent
its facilities, outsource activities previously done by its employees,
and borrow money. These forms of adaptation to external
circumstances involve potentially changing circumstances
internal to the firm. The co-owners may disagree about how the
firm should respond to external circumstances. As a matter of
default, on operational matters firms are to varying degrees
governed by majorities. Ordinary business decisions in a
partnership are governed by a majority vote of the partners, with
each partner having one vote. 166 Extraordinary decisions require
the unanimous consent of the partners. 167 In a corporation,
business decisions are controlled by the board of directors. 168 The
shareholders do not have direct control of the corporation, rather

165.

Id. § 701(a)(2).

166.

UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 4010) (1997) (amended 2013).

167.

Id.

168.

See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2010).
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the shareholders elect the directors. 16 9 However, unlike a
partnership, shareholders do not merely possess one vote each.
Rather, shareholders with more shares have more votes. A single
shareholder out of many, may control a majority of the votes and
elect a majority (or all) of the directors. 170 In an LLC, management
norms will depend on whether the firm is managed by its members
or managed by one or more managers. Member managed LLCs are
managed similar to partnerships. 171 Manager managed LLCs are
managed by the manager or managers. 172 These varying forms of
majoritarian control determine how the entity will adapt to
changed external circumstances. Conflict about how the firm
should adapt to changed external circumstances can lead to the
desire on the part of at least some co-owners to exit the entity.
At the time a business entity is created, the owners often do
not know two things about future circumstances internal to the
entity. First, they do not know whether in a future dispute among
the owners they will be in the majority or the minority. Because
the default voting arrangement among partners is one vote per
partner, a single partner does not know who will agree with her in
the future. Groups of partners can repeatedly shift, depending on
the question presented to the partnership. Predicting these
shifting alliances years in advance is impossible. The same is often
true among members in a member managed LLC. In a corporation,
shifting patterns of control are more complex. Members of the
board of directors can be elected and usually removed without
cause by shareholders. 173 Therefore, the owner of a majority of
shares has practical control over the business decisions in a
corporation. However, it is not always possible to predict who will
be the majority shareholder. Although a single shareholder may
own a majority of the shares when the corporation is formed,
future issuances of new shares may dilute the votes of the original
majority shareholder. Several factors affect the ability of the
initial majority shareholder to protect their majority. If the
articles of incorporation authorize only the shares originally
issued, issuing more shares in the future would require amending
the articles. The majority shareholder may prevent this. Even if

169.
See, e.g., id. § 8.03(c).
170.
Candidates for election to the board of directors who receive the most votes are
elected. Id. § 7.28(a). Therefore, a shareholder holding a majority of the shares can elect the
entire board. However, if the corporation allows cumulative voting, shareholders may
"stack up" their votes on one or more candidates. Id. § 7.28(c). This will sometimes allow a
minority shareholder to prevent a majority shareholder from electing the entire board.
171.
See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(b) (2013).
172.
See, e.g., id. § 407(c).
173.
Members of a staggered board are removable only for cause in Delaware. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2013).
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the articles authorize more shares than those originally issued,
issuance of new shares would require the approval of the board of
directors. This approval is of course subject to the influence of the
majority shareholder. Further, at the time of the future issuance,
the existing shareholders may have preemptive rights to purchase
some of the newly issued shares. However, even if the initial
majority shareholder has such protections, the initial majority
may break down. When the shareholder dies, her shares may be
inherited by more than one person, none of whom own a majority.
If the shareholder gets divorced, the shares may be divided among
the former spouses similarly splitting the majority. If the
shareholder cannot pay her debts, her creditors may execute on
some or all of the shares for payment of the debts. Thus, in any
form of business enterprise the question of which owners will
control business decisions in the future is not certain.
The second factor of uncertainty at inception about future
circumstances internal to the entity is whether a particular owner
or group of owners will want to exit the entity. As discussed in the
prior section, exit can involve ending the business entity by
voluntary dissolution, or can involve exit by one or more owners
while the entity continues. Either of these can arise as a result of
a dispute among the owners about how the business should be run,
including how it should respond to changed external
circumstances. Therefore, the uncertainty about whether a
particular co-owner will be in the majority or the minority on a
question of business operations is conceptually connected to
whether one or more co-owners will want to exit. However, an exit
by some owners or a voluntary dissolution can also result without
such a dispute. Some or all of the owners may just want to
withdraw their capital and redeploy it to other uses. They may
want to invest in another business, or may just want to spend their
money on personal expenditures. In either situation rules
governing exit will come into play. Of course, some of those rules
favor majorities and some favor individual co-owners.
The uncertainty about whether a particular co-owner will be
in the majority or the minority, and the uncertainty about whether
a particular co-owner will want an individual exit or a voluntary
dissolution combine in assessing what is the optimal rule for exit.
Under partnership norms, management rules about operations
favor the majority. However, exit rules favor the individual coowner. In a partnership at will, an individual partner can force a
dissolution and winding up. In a partnership for a term, an
individual partner can exit the partnership, and in some cases
force a quick buyout. In any case the exiting partner will at least
be paid at the end of term and will be compensated for any delay
in payment. Therefore, at the inception of the partnership an
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individual partner will know that if they are in the majority, they
will have management control, and if they are not they will have
the ability to exit. However, they also know that if they are in the
majority, they may face the dislocations that come from having to
174
deal with another partner exiting the partnership.
To avoid the possibility of having to deal with another coowner's untimely exit, a group of co-owners may choose corporate
norms. These norms favor the owners of the majority of the shares,
both on operational questions and on exit issues. On operational
issues the holder of the majority of the shares elects the directors
and the directors manage the business. On exit issues, the
majority can choose whether or not the corporation will voluntarily
dissolve. 175 Individual exit is not a matter of right and court
ordered dissolutions are often difficult. In choosing these
majoritarian norms an individual co-owner may be betting that
they will be in the majority in the future. They may also believe
that risk of dislocations caused by the easy minority exit of
partnership norms outweighs the risk of being in the minority
under corporate norms. The comparison of partnership and
corporate norms offers co-owners a menu of alternatives about
which risks they want to take.
The ULLCA default rules for management and exit offer a
different set of risks for co-owners. However, they are
substantially less attractive than either partnership or corporate
norms. ULLCA management norms are similar to partnership
norms or corporate norms, depending on whether the LLC is
member managed or manager managed. In either case, they are
majoritarian in nature. However, the exit norms under the
ULLCA are unlike either partnership or corporate norms. Under
the ULLCA, individual exit is difficult since expression leads to
the member being treated as a transferee of her own interest and
potentially waiting forever for a buyout unless she can obtain a
court-ordered dissolution. However, voluntary dissolution is
impossible without a unanimous vote of the members. Therefore,
paradoxically, an individual member may not manage the
business, nor may she effectively withdraw her capital from the
LLC, but may successfully prevent the voluntary dissolution of the
entity. The exit norms under the ULLCA do not favor the majority
or the minority if they are seeking an exit. Rather, they favor the
owners who want the entity to continue whether they are in the

174.

See Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, 2 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON

PARTNERSHIP, §7.02(d) (2014) (discussing the disadvantages of easy exit in a partnership).

175.
Delaware LLC law is conceptually similar to this, with the two-thirds voting
requirement for a voluntary dissolution somewhat altering the calculus. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(3) (2013).
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majority or the minority. While operational adaptations are
allowed at the behest of the majority, adaptation by exit is denied
both to the individual members and to a majority of members in
the absence of unanimity or a court-order. This does not seem like
a set of risks that most co-owners would pick ex ante.
One way of analyzing these varying bundles of risk and
reward is to look at them from the ex ante perspective of a
potential investor in a new business entity. When considering a
corporate form, the investor would see that there is the upside
potential of being in the majority. In the corporate majority, she
would be able to make operational decisions and not face the costs
of easy exit by her co-owners. In the majority, she would also be
able to cause a voluntary dissolution if she wanted one. However,
she would also know that in the future she might end up in the
minority. In which case she would be stuck in a business entity
being managed in a way with which she disagrees.
Alternatively she might choose partnership norms. In a
partnership there is still the upside potential of being in the
majority. There she would control the operational decisions.
However, she would face the potential costs of dealing with the
exit of partners who disagree with her management decisions.
Even in a partnership for a term, these costs could be substantial.
Indeed, if these dissenting partners exit in a particular sequence,
the partnership may dissolve. Therefore, the upside potential of
being in the majority is not as great as in the corporate setting.
However, in a partnership the downside potential of being in the
minority is also moderated by those very same easier exit aspects
of partnership norms.
If she chooses to invest in a LLC formed under the ULLCA,
the upside potential of being in the majority still includes
operational control of ordinary business decisions. Like corporate
norms, it also includes the ability to avoid the costs of easy exit by
dissenting minority owners. However, unlike corporate norms,
this upside potential of being in the majority does not include the
ability to cause a voluntary dissolution since under the ULLCA, a
unanimous vote of the members is required for a voluntary
dissolution. 176 When considering the downside potential of being
in the minority, the potential investor in a LLC formed under the
ULLCA would be stuck in an entity being managed in a way with
which she disagrees. Therefore, such an investment has the
176.
Not all jurisdictions enacting the ULLCA have adopted the unanimity
requirement. In California, for example, a limited liability company may be dissolved by
"the vote of a majority of the members of the limited liability company or a greater
percentage of the voting interests of members as may be specified in the articles of
organization, or a written operating agreement." CAL. CORP. CODE § 17707.01(b) (West
2016).
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downside of investing in a corporation, without all of the potential
upside. If she ends up in the minority she is stuck without easy
exit. If she ends up in the majority she cannot force a voluntary
dissolution. Indeed, she might end up in the minority on
operational questions, but in a very large majority on the question
of whether the LLC should voluntarily dissolve. However, if this
majority is short of unanimity, the voluntary dissolution is
impossible. This particular combination of risk and reward does
not seem very attractive.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Rules governing exit from different types of business entities
are a complex combination of rights and remedies. Exit by
individual owners may be easy or difficult. Exit may lead to
dissolution of the entity or continuation of the entity with a buyout
of the exiting owner. Collective exit by a majority is sometimes a
vehicle to force a voluntary dissolution. Potential investors in a
new entity face bounded rationality about whether they will be in
the minority or majority about operational questions and disputes
about whether the entity will voluntarily dissolve. They also face
bounded rationality about whether they will be the one seeking an
exit. Faced with this set of uncertainties, corporate norms and
partnership norms offer different bundles of risk and rewards. The
exit rules under the ULLCA offer neither the benefits of corporate
norms to the majority nor the benefits of partnership norms to the
minority.

